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SALES-SERVICE HYBRID TRANSACTIONS
AND THE STRICT LIABILITY DILEMMA
by Dana Shelhimer
HE doctrine of products liability without fault refers to both strict
tort liability' and implied warranties. 2 Strict liability protects injured
consumer plaintiffs by allowing them to recover damages without
having to prove the defendant's negligence. 3 Implied warranties provide re-
lief to purchasers of products when the goods purchased are not of the aver-
age quality that would pass without objection in the trade4 or when the
goods purchased fail to meet the buyer's specifications.5 Both strict tort lia-
bility and implied warranty impose a special duty on sellers of consumer
products to bear and redistribute the costs of injuries caused by defective
products. 6
This Comment addresses the protections afforded to consumers who
purchase defective products and services. First, the Comment provides a
brief introduction to implied warranties. Second, the Comment presents an
in-depth discussion of strict tort liability under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 402A 7 and its applicability to sales transactions, 8 service trans-
1. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states the doctrine of strict
tort liability. Strict tort liability can be traced back to Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
2. The Texas Business and Commerce Code codifies implied warranty law in Texas.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314, 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 2.314
states the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. Section 2.315 embodies the implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Id.
3. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 825-26
(1973); cf Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 777-82,
791-94 (1983) (argument that distinction between defectiveness in strict products liability and
negligence is illusory).
4. Section 2.314 embodies the implied warranty of merchantability. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
5. Section 2.315 embodies the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Id.
§ 2.315.
6. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1967).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. Sales transactions, as used in this Comment, refers to commercial transactions in
which a merchant sells a product to a consumer. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1810 (3d ed. 1981) defines a product as "something produced by physical labor
or intellectual effort: the result of work or thought... : a result of the operation of involuntary
causes or an ensuing set of conditions: . . . a substance produced from one or more other
substances as a result of chemical change." Id. The RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 713 (1st
ed. 1980) defines a product as "a result or outcome."
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actions, 9 and sales-service hybrid transactions.' 0 Third, the Comment
presents possible methods for analyzing sales-service hybrid transactions
under section 402A and determines that courts must decide each transaction
on a case-by-case basis in light of the policy justifications underlying strict
liability. This policy analysis includes giving careful consideration to the
public necessity of having affordable access to the particular type of
transaction.
I. IMPLIED WARRANTY
Implied warranty 1 reflects a strict liability concept.' 2 Implied warranties
impose a duty on sellers of goods, as a matter of public policy, to produce
and distribute safe products.' 3 Consequently, injured consumer plaintiffs
may recover regardless of whether or not they prove that the seller acted
negligently. 14
Texas adopted the implied warranty theory in Jacob E. Decker & Sons,
Inc. v. Capps. I The plaintiff in Decker became seriously ill as a result of
eating sausage manufactured by the defendant. Although the court found
that the defendant had not been negligent in any step of the manufacturing
process, it held the defendant strictly liable under an implied warranty the-
ory.' 6 The court imposed the implied warranty, which requires neither a
showing of privity of contract between the seller or manufacturer and the
consumer nor proof of negligence,' 7 as a matter of public policy.' 8 The
court justified its creation of an implied warranty by explaining the difficul-
ties associated with bringing either a contract claim or a negligence claim.' 9
The court found that if it limited the plaintiff to a contract cause of action,
the plaintiff would face the problems associated with proving privity.20 By
the same reasoning, if the court limited the plaintiff to a negligence cause of
9. In a service transaction the consumer purchases a service rather than a product. For
instance, one purchases the service of transportation when one hires a taxi driver. See gener-
ally Wunsch, The Definition of a Product for the Purposes of Section 402A, 50 INS. COUNS. J.
344, 354-57 (1983) (distinction between pure commercial services and pure professional
services).
10. Hybrid transactions involve both the sale of a product and the rendition of a service.
In most instances, a service provider uses a product incidentally to providing the consumer
with a service. For instance, a beautician incidentally uses a permanent wave solution while
providing a consumer with skilled service. See Wunsch, supra note 9, at 357-62.
11. An implied warranty resembles a "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort
and contract." Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
12. See Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575,
578-79 (1974).
13. The policy justifications underlying strict liability also justify the application of im-
plied warranties. For a discussion of the public policy rationales underlying strict liability, see
Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970). See also infra notes 51-
57 and accompanying text.
14. Prosser, supra note 11, at 1126.
15. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
16. Id. at 611, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
17. Id.
18. Id.




action, the court would in essence be denying the plaintiff recovery because
of the near impossibility of proving negligence. 2'
Texas codified the judicially created implied warranty recognized in
Decker when it adopted its own version of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). 22 The Texas Business and Commerce Code provisions provide con-
sumers with two types of strict liability protection: implied warranty of
merchantability 23 and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 24
The implied warranty of merchantability protects consumers by allowing
them to recover damages 25 when the good sold is not fit for the ordinary
purpose for which it was sold. 26 Under the UCC implied warranty of
merchantability, the plaintiff must show that the good was not of fair aver-
age quality and that it would not pass without objection in the trade.27 In
addition, an implied warranty of merchantability arises only when the seller
acts as a merchant with respect to goods of that kind 28 and when the good is
defective at the time it leaves the seller's control. 29
21. Id. at 621-22, 164 S.W.2d at 834.
22. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1976). Texas incorporated the Uniform Commercial Code's
implied warranty of merchantability (§ 2-314) and implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose (§ 2-315) in the Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.314, 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
(a) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
(b) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(2) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(3) are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used; and
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(5) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(6) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(c) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
24. Id. § 2.315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
25. The legislature designed the remedy for breach of implied warranty to provide the
injured consumer with the equivalent of the average good he would have received had the good
been as warranted. This recovery includes consequential damages from loss of use of the prod-
uct, direct economic losses, and loss for personal injury. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal
Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 327 (Tex. 1978); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc, v. Shivers, 557
S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. 1977).
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
27. Id. § 2.314(b)(l)-(2).
28. Id. § 2.314(a).
29. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES §§ 5-10 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose provides relief to
injured product consumers when the purchased goods fail to meet a buyer's
specific requirements.3 0 To recover under an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose, the plaintiff must prove two facts. First, the plaintiff
must establish that the seller knew or had reason to know of the particular
purpose for which the goods were purchased. 3' Second, the buyer must
prove that he relied on the seller's skill or judgment to select the proper
goods for his needs. 32 The strictness of these requirements generally pre-
vents plaintiffs from recovering under the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.
The implied warranty provisions of the Business and Commerce Code ap-
ply in situations that involve the sale of goods by a merchant. 33 They do not
apply to service transactions. 34 As a result, Texas courts generally apply the
Code's implied warranties only to sales transactions and apply negligence
standards to service transactions. 35 In some instances, however, the courts
have applied a judicially created implied warranty of good and workmanlike
performance to service contracts that otherwise would fall outside of the
UCC.3 6  Similarly, some courts have applied the warranty of
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). For the text of
§ 2.315 see supra note 24.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Texas Business and Commerce Code expressly states that its provisions apply to
transactions in goods sold by merchants. Id. § 2.102.
34. An implied warranty does not exist in service contracts unless some body of law other
than the Code so provides. Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.
1982) (building contracts are hybrid transactions involving both services and materials, and
are governed by article 2 of UCC only if essence of contract is sale of materials).
35. See, e.g., Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1985) (implied warranty not
applied to psychiatrist); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d, 342, 346 (Tex. 1968) (strict liability not
applied to optometrist); Beck, Advertising, Specialization and Warranty Liability, 44 TEx B.I.
595, 598-600 (1981) (warranty theory not applied to attorneys); Note, Breach of Implied War-
ranty Under the DTPA as Applied to Service Contracts.- Diversified Human Resources Group,
Inc. v. PB-KBB, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 549, 556 (1985) (unnecessarily harsh liability need not be
placed on service contractors because both tort and contract law provide adequate relief to
injured consumers). The refusal of Texas courts to apply an implied warranty theory to pro-
fessional service contracts, however, does not prevent the extension of an implied warranty of
workmanlike performance to nonprofessional service contracts. For cases in which the Texas
courts have applied an implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance to service
contracts, see infra note 36.
36. See, e.g., Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. 1988) (implied war-
ranty of good and workmanlike performance applies to horse training services); Melody Home
Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987) (implied warranty of good and workman-
like performance applies to services involving repair or modification of existing tangible goods
or property); Griffin v. Eakin, 656 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance applies to printing of book); Thomas
v. Atlas Found. Co., 609 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance applies to building of porch); Harri-
son v. Dallas Court Reporting College, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. Civ. App-Dallas
1979, no writ) (implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance applies to paving of
parking lot); Dismukes v. H & S Water Well Serv., 439 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1969, no writ) (implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance applies to drill-
ing of water well).
COMMENTS
merchantability to sales-service hybrid transactions. 37
The different remedies available under strict liability and implied war-
ranty illustrate the need for the two causes of action. When a defective or
substandard product causes personal injury, the remedies under strict liabil-
ity and implied warranty overlap. Both section 402A and the UCC's im-
plied warranties prohibit a seller from disclaiming liability for personal
injuries resulting from inadequate products. 38 An implied warranty action,
which allows recovery for economic loss, however, offers a broader scope of
recovery than does a section 402A action. If a plaintiff suffers only economic
loss and does not suffer property damage or personal injury, the plaintiff
may recover under an implied warranty theory but not under strict liabil-
ity. 3 9 Nevertheless, when a defective product has caused only property dam-
age, strict liability may be the plaintiff's only means of recovery because
implied warranty law, although it does not allow sellers to disclaim damages
for personal injuries, does allow sellers to limit or disclaim property loss
damages.40 Thus, although a plaintiff may recover more under an implied
warranty cause of action, strict liability often is the only cause of action
available to the plaintiff.
II. STRICT LIABILITY
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A enunciates the doctrine
of strict products liability. 4 1 Section 402A imposes strict liability on sellers
of unreasonably dangerous products that cause physical harm to the prod-
uct's ultimate user or to the user's property. 42 By focusing solely on the
condition of the product, this doctrine allows plaintiffs to recover damages
37. See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (strict liability applied to hospital for supplying
defective gown); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ dism'd) (implied warranty applied to service of providing medication).
38. Sellers of defective products cannot disclaim liability for personal injury under § 402A
or under implied warranties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965)
(strict products liability is not affected by disclaimer); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 2.719(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (limitation of consequential damages for personal injury
is prima facie unconscionable).
39. Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1977).
40. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 comment 7 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states
that when goods are sold "as is," the buyer takes the entire risk as to the quality of the goods.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer:(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
42. Id. § 402A(l).
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without having to prove the defendant's negligence. 43 In other words, if a
merchant sells an unreasonably dangerous product, the merchant will be lia-
ble for physical harm to persons or property despite the fact that the manu-
facturer used reasonable care in manfacturing the product.44
The growth of strict liability in Texas paralleled the development of im-
plied warranties. In McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.45 the Supreme Court
of Texas adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
thereby extended the implied warranty recognized in Decker46 to defective
products causing physical harm to persons or property. 47 Thus, an injured
consumer could recover monetary damages either under an implied war-
ranty contract cause of action or under a strict liability tort cause of action.
A. Application of Section 402A
1. Pure Sale Transaction
Section 402A, by its own terms, applies only to sellers of unreasonably
dangerous products who engage in the regular business of selling products. 48
Consequently, courts face little or no difficulty when applying the doctrine to
pure sale transactions. 4 9 A pure sale transaction occurs when the sole pur-
pose of the transaction is to purchase a product.50 This type of transaction
does not involve the purchase of a service.
The policy reasons behind strict products liability justify the application of
the doctrine to pure sale transactions. 5 1 Courts have recognized four basic
policy justifications for strict liability. First, supporters of strict products
43. See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975) (Texas Supreme Court empha-
sized that the supplier's conduct was irrelevant and was not to be considered in strict tort
liability causes of action); Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 13, 16 (1978); cf. Powers, supra note 3, at 777-82, 791-94 (argument that the
distinction between defectiveness in strict products liability and negligence is at times illusory).
44. To recover under a theory of strict liability a plaintiff must establish "(1) the defective
and unreasonably dangerous condition of the defendant's product and (2) a causal connection
between such condition and the plaintiff's injuries or damages." Armstrong Rubber Co. v.
Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. 1978). Although courts originally applied the doctrine
only in pure sale transactions, today, courts have at times sporadically expanded the doctrine
to cover certain sales-service hybrid transactions. See cases cited infra note 77.
45. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (strict liability applied to beauty supply distributor for
sale of permanent wave solution not reasonably fit for use).
46. 139 Tex. 609, 621, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (1942).
47. 416 S.W.2d at 789.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(a) (1965). Some commentators have
argued that because § 402A appears in a chapter entitled "Suppliers of Chattels," and because
all of the examples used in the comments refer to tangible chattels, the drafters of § 402A
clearly intended to exclude service transactions from the section's scope.
49. See Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Bowman Biscuit Co. v.
Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
50. For instance, when a person goes into a store, purchases a product, and leaves, the
transaction constitutes a pure sale transaction because the customer purchased a product with-
out a service being involved. For a discussion of sales transactions, see supra note 8 and ac-
companying text.
51. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 201 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1965).
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liability allege that imposing liability upon those who place products into the
marketplace, or stream of commerce, internalizes accident costs within the
overall cost of the product. 52 Because the company can raise prices and thus
spread the costs of liability among all of a product's consumers, strict liabil-
ity functions as a risk distributor in that neither the victim nor the manufac-
turer alone must directly absorb the costs of liability. 53 Second, because of
the complexity and secretiveness of the manufacturing process, proof of an
act of negligence that occurred during the manufacturing process would be
overly burdensome, if not impossible, to show.5 4 Supporters of strict prod-
ucts liability therefore advocate that courts should hold those who place the
defective product into the market strictly liable. Third, supporters of strict
liability as applied to pure sale transactions allege that liability should be
placed upon those who possess the means and ability to discover and prevent
defects, rather than upon the innocent consumer who cannot investigate the
manufacturing process or determine a product's safety. 55 Lastly, some
courts urge that because consumers reasonably expect manufacturers to pro-
duce safe products, those in the marketing chain should bear the cost when
consumers' expectations prove unfounded. 56 According to this view, when
manufacturers falsely create expectations of safety and quality, they should
bear the costs of liability when those expectations fail. 57
2. Pure Service Transaction
Courts rarely apply section 402A strict liability to pure service transac-
tions.5 8 A pure service transaction occurs when the consumer focuses solely
52. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Lia-
bility for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 809 (1976).
53. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Some Ob-
servations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966) (discussion of strict
liability as a risk distributor); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799
(1966) (discussion of strict liability as a risk distributor); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment c (1965) (discussion of strict liability as risk distributor).
54. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring); Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L. REV.
415, 425 (1984); Wade, supra note 3, at 826.
55. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring); Greenfield, Consumer Pro-
tection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L.
REV. 661, 688 (1974); Note, Products and the Professionak Strict Liability in the Sale-Service
Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 117 (1972).
56. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d
444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 390-91 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A com-
ment c (1965).
57. Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 390-91 (1977).
58. For examples of cases that refused to apply § 402A to service transactions, see Winans
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. William C. Ellis &
Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1979), op. replaced in parts, 609 F.2d 820
(1979); Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1972);
Klein v. Council of Chem. Assoc., 587 F. Supp. 213, 223 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Lemley v. J & B Tire
Co., 426 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v.
Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Alaska 1980); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 122
Ariz. 174, 593 P.2d 924, 928 (Ct. App. 1978); Pena v. Sita World Travel, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d
642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1978); Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 930, 141
1989]
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on the service provided rather than on products the service provider inciden-
tally uses in performing the service.5 9 For example, a pure service transac-
tion occurs when a repairperson goes to a home and reattaches a loose wire
in an air conditioner. In this instance, the repairperson does not add a new
product or good to an air conditioning unit, but simply reattaches an already
existing wire. Consequently, the consumer focuses solely on the service pro-
vided, and pays for a service rather than a product. 60
Courts often state two justifications for refusing to extend section 402A
liability to pure service transactions. First, they allege that by its own terms
the doctrine applies only to those who sell products, and not to those who
sell or provide a service. 6 1 Secondly, the courts assert that the application of
strict liability to pure service transactions does not further the policy reasons
underlying strict tort liability. 62
Specifically, courts and commentators state four policy reasons to support
the well-established standard that strict liability does not apply to pure ser-
vice transactions. First, producers of services, unlike producers of products,
often lack the large customer pool necessary to spread their losses effec-
tively,63 primarily because service providers, unlike mass products produ-
cers, custom tailor their services to meet the specific needs of individual
customers.64 In addition, since a service consists primarily of the skill,
knowledge, and competence of the service provider, the servicer, in most
instances, does not employ the elements of a marketing chain. As a result,
the servicer, unlike the product seller, cannot spread the costs of liability
among retailers or other members of the marketing chain. Consequently,
the imposition of strict liability upon service providers fails to further the
fundamental purposes of the doctrine.
65
Cal. Rptr. 95, 103 (1977); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88, 91 (Del.
1977); Hinojasa v. Automatic Elevator Co., 92 Il. App. 3d 351, 416 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1980);
Hunt v. Guaranty Elec. Co., 667 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Siciliano v. Capitol City
Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984); Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117
N.H. 556, 374 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1977); Steckal v. Haughton Elevator Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 628,
629, 449 N.E.2d 1264, 1264-65, 463 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186-87 (1983); Nickel v. Hyster Co., 97
Misc. 2d 770, 412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Inc., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76, 78 (1974); Nevaux v. Park Place Hosp., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923,
926 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. See Sales, supra note 43, at 18.
60. See Lemley v. J. & B. Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (§ 402A not
applied to brakeman who repaired plaintiff's brakes because § 402A does not apply to persons
who supply a service).
61. See id. Section 402A applies only to sellers. Although "sellers" has been expanded to
include retailers, manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and suppliers, this provision does
not include suppliers of services. Id.
62. See generally Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391, 396-98
(1980) (application of strict liability to service providers does not further the goals underlying
the theory).
63. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968); Sales, supra
note 43, at 18.
64. See La Rossa, 402 F.2d at 942; Sales, supra note 43, at 19; Comment, Guidelines for
Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 365, 369 (1976).
65. See Sales, supra note 43, at 19; Note, supra note 62, at 396; Comment supra note 64, at
[Vol. 43
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Second, unlike purchasers of defective products, purchasers of defective
services face little or no difficulty in locating the source of the defect. 66 The
service transaction represents a face-to-face relationship in which the con-
sumer seeks the skills, knowledge, and expertise of the service provider. Be-
cause consumers injured by defective services can typically point to both the
specific service provider and the defective conduct, a negligence standard
more appropriately governs pure service transactions. 67
Third, product manufacturers exercise substantial control over the mecha-
nized production process because the process consists of a single set of oper-
ations applicable to each element of the manufactured product. This control
affords manufacturers the ability to detect, prevent, and eliminate defects
that may occur throughout the process. 68 Producers of services, to the con-
trary, cannot be expected to act with the exactness of machines. With each
new consumer, a service provider faces a new and different set of circum-
stances. Consequently, the servicer, unlike the manufacturer, cannot de-
velop and perfect a single set of operations applicable to each and every
situation.
69
Finally, consumer expectations differ according to whether the transaction
constitutes a sale or a service. 70 When purchasing a product, a consumer
reasonably expects the product to be free from all defects. When purchasing
a service, on the other hand, a consumer expects that the service will be
performed using reasonable care, skill, and expertise. 7' In a service transac-
tion, therefore, unlike a sales transaction, the consumer focuses on the con-
duct of the service provider and the quality of the work, rather than on the
66. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968); Note, supra
note 62, at 398.
67. See Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179, 1182-83 (1972)
(strict liability not applied to builder because plaintiff would not be overly burdened by having
to establish builder's negligence); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 23, 539 P.2d
584, 588 (1975). The court in Hoffman explained that unlike the sale of products, personal
services do not result in the mass production of goods. Id. As a result, the difficulty or inabil-
ity of obtaining proof does not exist in the personal services transaction. Id. Furthermore, the
plaintiff in the personal service context can determine exactly what was done and by whom
because the plaintiff usually comes into direct contact with the service provider. Id.
68. For an illustration of safety checks integrated into the manufacturing process, see
Saglimbeni v. West End Brewing Co., 274 A.D. 201, 213, 80 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1948), aff'd,
298 N.Y.875, 84 N.E.2d 638 (1949).
69. In distinguishing service transactions from the mechanical manufacturing of products,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d
II (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), stated, a doctor's
"performance is not mechanical or routine because each patient requires individual study and
formulation of an informed judgment as to the physical or mental disability or condition
presented, and the course of treatment needed." Id. at 596, 258 A.2d at 703.
70. Sales, supra note 43, at 18. But see Greenfield, supra note 55, at 697-98 (author argues
that consumer expectations for services are the same as for products).
71. Sales, supra note 43, at 29 states:
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill. They have a
duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of members of their profes-
sion, and a failure to discharge that duty will subject them to liability for negli-
gence. Those who hire such persons are not justified in expecting infallibility,
but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service,
not insurance.
Id. (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954)).
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condition of a product that the servicer may incidentally use in performing
the transaction. In sum, transactions that focus on a person's conduct do
not logically fall under a doctrine that focuses solely on the condition of a
product .72
3. Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions
The typical sales-service hybrid transaction involves furnishing a product
in conjunction with the performance of a personal service contract.7 3 Hy-
brid transactions confuse the courts because the applicable standard of con-
duct rests somewhere between strict liability and negligence. If a court
determines that the transaction involves the provision of a service rather
than the sale of a product, then the plaintiff must recover under a negligence
theory rather than a strict liability theory. 74 In applying a negligence stan-
dard, the court focuses on the conduct of the service provider rather than on
the condition of the product.7 5 When a case involves the sale of a defective
product, however, the court applies strict tort liability. In doing so, the
court focuses solely on the condition of the product and ignores the defend-
ant's actions. 76 The question arises, therefore, of where to focus when a
transaction involves both a sale and a service. Should the court apply strict
tort liability or negligence?
The majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, have acted inconsistently
when dealing with sales-service hybrid transactions. 77 Texas case law serves
as an example of the ad hoc approach taken by many courts to the sales-
service hybrid transaction issue. 78  Furthermore, Texas case law demon-
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The wording of § 402A clearly
indicates that the section concerns defective products. It does not mention the conduct that
makes these products defective. Therefore, if one interprets § 402A literally, it should only
apply to the condition of a product, and courts should use negligence to govern peoples' con-
duct. Furthermore, comment f to § 402A limits application to "any person engaged in the
business of selling products." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965)
(emphasis added). This definition necessarily excludes service agencies, which sell primarily
services and not products.
73. Sales, supra note 43, at 13.
74. Id. at 18.
75. In a negligence suit, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to use reason-
able care. Reasonable care is determined by what a reasonably prudent person would do in the
same or similar situation. Bennet v. Span Indus., 628 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements for a strict
liability cause of action.
77. See, e.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d I I (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969) (permanent wave solution ap-
plied by beautician held to be product sale, thus § 402A applicable); Hoover v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76, 77 (1974) (strict liability not applied to retailer of tires
who failed to tighten lug nuts); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 588-89 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (strict liability applicable to provider of
contaminated water); Ethicon v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ) (strict liability not applied to doctor who used defective needle during
surgery).
78. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist not held strictly liable
for defective contact lenses); Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hospital held strictly liable for defective
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strates the need to develop a comprehensive analysis for distinguishing sales
from services so that one may determine in the future when a provider of a
service becomes a seller of a product so as to come within the scope of sec-
tion 402A.
B. Texas Case Law
1. Professional Sales-Service Transactions
a. Medical Professionals
Texas, along with the majority of jurisdictions, generally refuses to apply
strict tort liability to medical professionals who inadequately provide serv-
ices to their patients. 79 Courts hold to this course despite the fact that the
medical professional may use or provide defective products while performing
or administering medical treatment. 80 Nevertheless, because medical profes-
sionals primarily provide services rather than sell products, 8' the usual pol-
icy justifications for strict liability appear inapplicable to medical sales-
service transactions. In addition, the availability of affordable medical serv-
ices may override such policy reasons in some cases. 82
Although no Texas court has specifically articulated the policy rationale
for refusing to apply strict liability to medical professionals, other courts
have stated several policy reasons for refusing to hold medical professionals
strictly liable. In Magrine v. Krasnica,83 for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court refused to hold a dentist strictly liable when a defective hy-
podermic needle broke off in the plaintiff's jaw. 84 The court recognized that
unlike product manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, medical profes-
sionals occupy no better position than their patients in terms of discovering
gown); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 587-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist. 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (strict liability applied to provider of contaminated water); Erwin
v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (strict liability inapplicable to transmitter of electricity).
79. Vergott v. Deseret Pharm. Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1972); Barbee v. Rogers, 425
S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968); Nevaux v. Park Place Hosp., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791,
796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hospital held strictly
liable for defective gown); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1980, writ dism'd) (hospital held strictly liable for defective drug administered during
surgery).
80. See generally Comment, Hospital Liability-Seller of a Product or Provider of Serv-
ices-Is the Distinction Necessary?, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 397 (1982) (discussing hospital liability in
situations where nonculpable employee sets in motion instrumentality that causes plaintiff's
injuries).
81. See Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
82. In Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379, 392-93 (1977), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, emphasizing that application of the doctrine of strict liability would interfere
with the availability of essential medical services, held that strict liability does not apply to the
provision of medical services.
83. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539, 541-46 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53
N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
84. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 540.
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and preventing defects in products used during medical treatment. 85 The
patient focuses on the skills, knowledge, and expertise of the physician
rather than on the condition of the instruments and medicines incidental to
the medical treatment. 86
Similarly, the risk distribution and loss spreading justification for strict
liability appears counterproductive when applied to medical professionals. 8
7
When courts hold a product manufacturer strictly liable, the manufacturer
simply spreads the costs throughout all of the product's consumers by rais-
ing prices.88 Unlike many products, however, affordable medical treatment
is a public necessity. Consequently, public policy mandates that costs of
medical care remain reasonable. 89 Despite the existence of liability insur-
ance, medical costs rise when courts hold medical professionals strictly lia-
ble.90 The application of strict liability to medical professionals therefore
defeats the goal of keeping medical costs to a minimum. As a result, the
usual policy justifications of loss or risk distribution do not apply in the med-
ical professional context.
The Texas Supreme Court first considered the applicability of strict liabil-
ity to medical professionals in Barbee v. Rogers.91 The plaintiff, who suffered
eye injuries as the result of improperly fitted contact lenses, sued both the
optometrist and the manufacturer of the lenses. The court refused to impose
strict tort liability on the lens manufacturer because it found that the lenses
did not constitute a defective product. 92 The court determined that the de-
fect, if it existed, resulted from the professional services of the optometrist
rather than from the contact lenses he fitted and sold.93
Although the court recognized that the transaction constituted a hybrid
between a professional service and a sale, the court nevertheless did not feel
justified in holding the optometrist strictly liable. 94 The court based its deci-
sion in part on the distinction between a licensed optometrist and a "mere
merchant." '95 A merchant sells prefitted spectacles without a prescription,
whereas a licensed optometrist fits and prescribes lenses according to each
85. Id. at 543; see also Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392, 397
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (blood transfusion falls
into category of "unavoidably unsafe product").
86. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 545.
87. See Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379, 392 (1977), for a discussion of
why courts should not apply strict liability to providers of medical services.
88. For a discussion of the risk distribution policy underlying strict liability, see supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
89. In Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697, 703 (1969), the New Jersey
Supreme Court contrasted professional and nonprofessional services by emphasizing social
utility. The court determined that the utility and the need for medical-professional services,
which necessarily involve the health and survival of many people, outweighs the policy justifi-
cations for imposing strict liability on medical professionals. Id.
90. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 543-46.
91. 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
92. Id. at 346.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 345-46.
95. Id. (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552, 4565d (Vernon 1976)).
[Vol. 43
COMMENTS
person's individual needs. 96 As a result, a licensed optometrist does not
place finished products into the regular channels of trade as does a
merchant. 97 The court therefore determined that the transaction between
the optometrist and patient constituted a professional service rather than a
commercial sale.98
Two months later, in Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hospital, Inc. ,99 the Tyler
court of appeals addressed the issue of whether or not strict liability under
section 402A applies to a hospital when a patient suffers injuries during the
course of medical treatment. The plaintiff suffered injuries when the hospital
administered a bacteria-contaminated anti-coagulant in connection with the
treatment of phlebitis. The bacteria entered the plaintiff's bloodstream,
which caused her to go into extreme shock and remain close to death for five
days. The court, despite its recognition that Texas applies strict liability to
both manufacturers and distributors of medical products, refused to hold the
defendant hospital strictly liable.I°° In reaching its conclusion, the court re-
lied heavily on the Barbee decision. 0 1
The court in Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co. 102 reaffirmed that sec-
tion 402A strict liability does not apply to hospitals or medical professionals.
In this case the plaintiff received injuries as a result of a needle breaking in
her vein during medical treatment. Emphasizing that the hospital did not
engage in the business of selling needles, the court held that strict liability
could not attach to the hospital.10 3
Until the early 1980s it appeared that Texas courts would not extend strict
liability concepts to medical professionals. In 1980 and 1981, however, two
different courts of appeals departed from case precedent and held hospitals
strictly liable. 10 4 In Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hospital 105 the plaintiff filed a
strict liability suit against the hospital when her husband, a patient in the
hospital, died as a result of sustaining burns over a substantial portion of his
body. The deceased received the burns when he dropped a lighted match in
an oxygenated room, which caused his hospital gown to ignite. The court
refused to grant the hospital immunity under the accepted medical profes-
sional exception to strict tort liability. 106 Although the court acknowledged
that the hospital provided the gown only incidentally to the medical services,
the court nevertheless held that strict liability applied because the hospital
96. Id. at 345.
97. Id. at 346.
98. Id.
99. 427 S.W.2d 104, 104-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Id. at 107.
101. Id.; see Barbee, 425 S.W.2d at 346.
102. 463 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1972).
103. Id. at 16 n.5; see Ethicon v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (doctor not strictly liable for defective needle that broke in patient's
body during surgery).
104. Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ dism'd).
105. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Id. at 797.
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placed the gown, an unreasonably dangerous product, into the stream of
commerce. 1
0 7
Similarly, the Waco court of appeals held a hospital strictly liable in Provi-
dence Hospital v. Truly.10 8 The plaintiff, who sustained injuries as a result of
a defective medicine administered during surgery, brought suit against the
hospital under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 10 9 alleging that adminis-
tration of the defective drug constituted a breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.110 The court, in direct contradiction of Bar-
bee"' and its progeny, held that strict liability applied to the hospital be-
cause it had sold the defective drug to the plaintiff." 2 Thus, the court
allowed the plaintiff to recover under an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.' 13 The court determined that the hospital sold the defec-
tive medication to the plaintiff because the itemized hospital bill contained a
separate charge for the drug." 14 Although the patient paid only one lump
sum for the services and medications she received, the total bill consisted of
several individual charges, one of which was the charge for the drug admin-
istered during surgery.
Despite Providence Hospital, Texas courts appear to have returned to re-
fusing to apply strict liability to medical professionals who incidentally use
defective products during the rendition of medical services. In Nevaux v.
Park Place Hospital "5 the plaintiff brought suit against the hospital and
treating physicians for injuries she sustained while receiving cobalt therapy.
Basing its decision on two separate grounds, the court refused to hold either
the hospital or the physician strictly liable.' 16 First, the court found that the
radiation treatment supplied by the defendants constituted the sale of a ser-
vice rather than the sale of a product. 1 7 The court explained that strict
liability applies to defective products, not to defective services." 8 Second,
107. Id. at 796-97. The court explained:
It is true that the essence of the relationship between a physician and his patient
relates to the professional services and skill he offers and the patient purchases
.. . . Where, as here, a hospital apparently supplies a product unrelated to the
essential professional relationship, we hold that it cannot be said that as a matter
of law the hospital did not introduce the harmful product into the stream of
commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
108. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
109. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.50(a)(2), 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987).
110. For a discussion of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, see supra
notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
111. 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
112. 611 S.W.2d at 131-33. In Barbee the court refused to hold an optometrist strictly
liable because the plaintiff sustained his injuries during the rendition of professional services.
Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 345-46 (Tex. 1968). For a discussion of Barbee, see supra
text accompanying notes 91-98.
113. 611 S.W.2d at 131-33.
114. Id. at 131.
115. 656 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. Id. at 926.
117. Id.
118. Id. In finding that strict liability applies to sales and not to services, the court relied on
the holding in Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968). The court, however, did not
deny that a hospital may act as a merchant in some instances. Id.
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the court determined that the Thomas" 9 holding did not apply to the facts
of the case at hand.' 20 Unlike Thomas, where the hospital gown was unre-
lated to the medical treatment, the cobalt therapy at issue, even if considered
a product, constituted an inseparable part of the professional services
rendered. 121
b. Nonmedical Professionals and the Sales-Service Hybrid Transaction
The majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, do not apply strict tort lia-
bility to nonmedical professionals 2 2 involved in hybrid transactions. 23 The
policy rationales for refusing to do so parallel those for refusing to hold med-
ical professionals liable in hybrid transactions. 24 Like the consumer in a
medical professional transaction, the consumer in a nonmedical professional
transaction focuses on the skill and competence with which the service pro-
vider renders the service rather than on the condition of products inciden-
tally used in performing the service.' 25 In addition, the nonmedical
professional, unlike the mass product producer, does not have a large body
of consumers among which to distribute the costs of liability.126
In Langford v. Kraft 127 the plaintiffs sued a professional engineer for dam-
ages to their land caused by the diversion of surface waters onto the prop-
erty. The defendant designed and developed a drainage system for a new
subdivision in which the plaintiffs purchased real estate. The defendant's
119. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
120. 656 S.W.2d at 926.
121. Id.
122. "A professional is one who continually must exercise intellectual judgment, predi-
cated upon high educational achievement, in the performance of his duties, and whose clients
rely upon that judgment." Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 631
(1973). A professional's skill involves both mechanical and judgmental ability; the former
includes a "mastery of routine procedures," but the latter constitutes the essential and distinc-
tive quality of professionalism. Id. at 633-45.
123. K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group, 489 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D. Conn. 1980) (ar-
chitect); Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d
898, 914, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886, 894 (1981) (engineers, architects); Mechanical Rubber & Supply
Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 80 Il1. App. 3d 262, 399 N.E.2d 722, 723 (1980) (engineer-
designer); Langford v. Kraft, 551 S.W.2d 392, 396-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977),
aff'd, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978) (engineer).
124. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy rationales
for strict liability and their application to medical professionals. See generally W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 674 (3d ed. 1964) (discussion of policy rationales underlying strict
liability).
125. As the California Supreme Court said in Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d
15 (1954) (en banc):
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill. They have a
duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of members of their profes-
sion, and a failure to discharge that duty will subject them to liability for negli-
gence. Those who hire such persons are not justified in expecting infallibility,
but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service,
not insurance.
275 P.2d at 21.
126. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).
127. 551 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977), affld, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.
1978).
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design, however, proved faulty in that it diverted the natural flow of surface
water onto the plaintiff's land.
Although the plaintiffs purchased the defendant's services, they also
purchased a product, the finished designs and plans. The Texas Supreme
Court, however, viewed the transaction solely as one involving the rendition
of professional services. 128  The court determined that unlike Barbee,129
where a sale took place incidentally to the performance of professional serv-
ices, the case at hand involved a purely professional service transaction be-
cause the engineer planned an economic venture for the plaintiffs for which
he charged a fee. 130 Consequently, the court concluded that section 402A
did not apply to the professional services the engineer rendered.' 3' The
court, however, did hold the defendant strictly liable for trespass to plain-
tiffs' land caused by the diversion of surface waters. 132 Thus, according to
this holding, while professional status may protect against strict product lia-
bility, it will not protect against other types of tort liability.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Texas law, refused
to apply section 402A to the defendant in Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co. 133 The plaintiff, a feed lot operator, purchased a diet supplement
from the defendant in order to increase the weight of its cattle. 134 The sup-
plement nevertheless failed to make the cattle gain weight as expected. 35
The plaintiff, urging that strict liability applied to the defendant because it
sold a defective product, sued under both section 402A and breach of im-
plied warranty. 136
In an effort to avoid strict liability under section 402A and the implied
warranty theories, 137 the defendant argued that it could not be held strictly
liable because it provided a professional service to Texsun. Ralston alleged
that it provided the plaintiff with professional consultation services and that
its manufacture and sale of the diet supplement was only incidental to its
professional services. According to Ralston, therefore, the court should ana-
lyze the transaction as a professional service rather than as a sale of a prod-
128. 551 S.W.2d at 396.
129. 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
130. 551 S.W.2d at 396. "The general rule is applicable that those who sell their services
for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and personal affairs are not liable in the
absence of negligence or intentional misconduct." Id. (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d
481, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 395. The court relied on the theory of trespass embodied in RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 822 (1939).
133. 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971).
134. In an effort to prepare cattle for market as rapidly as possible, feed lot operators often
feed dietary supplements to their cattle. The dietary supplement enhances the cattle's appetite,
which causes them to eat more and gain weight more rapidly. Id. at 662.
135. Although the cattle did gain weight, the weight gain did not progress as rapidly as
Ralston had indicated it would. Id. at 663. The additional time the cattle had to remain in
Texsun's feed yard to achieve the desired weight resulted in higher costs per pound of weight
gain. Thus, Texsun suffered economic losses.
136. Id. at 660.




uct. Although the court rejected Ralston's attempt to bring the case within
the rule announced in Barbee,' 38 the court refused to apply section 402A
because it found that while the supplement did not produce the expected
results, it did not constitute an unreasonably dangerous product. 39 Thus,
the transaction did not fall within the ambit of strict tort liability.
In analyzing the implied warranty claim, the court found that Ralston
primarily engaged in the business of selling ration supplements rather than
in the business of providing professional services.' 40 The court explained
that the company offered the nutrition consultant's services in order to pro-
mote increased sales of the diet supplement rather than to give expert advice
to consumers who purchased the ration supplement.' 4 ' The court con-
cluded that it would be unrealistic to treat the sale of the ration supplement
separately from the rendition of the professional advice and assistance when
in essence Ralston's advice and assistance merely constituted part of the
sales package.1 42 Consequently, the court allowed Texsun to recover dam-
ages from Ralston under an implied warranty theory. 143
2. Nonprofessional Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions
Although the majority of jurisdictions agree that strict tort liability ap-
plies neither to pure service transactions 14 4 nor to professional sales-service
hybrid transactions, 145 the various jurisdictions have not unanimously de-
cided the issue of whether section 402A applies to nonprofessionals involved
in hybrid transactions. 4 6 Because Texas courts have not yet decided a case
involving nonprofessionals and the doctrine of strict tort liability in the
sales-service context, this section focuses on case law from other jurisdic-
tions that has addressed the issue. These decisions provide a framework for
assessing how Texas courts would react in similar fact situations.
In Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. 147 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended
strict tort liability to a beautician. The plaintiff in Newmark sustained per-
138. 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968).
139. 447 F.2d at 666.
140. Id. at 667-68.
141. Id. at 668.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for more information concerning a pure ser-
vice transaction.
145. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for more information concerning sales-ser-
vice hybrid transactions.
146. For cases where courts have applied strict liability to nonprofessionals, see Stafford v.
International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1981); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 122 Ariz.
174, 593 P.2d 924 (1978); Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (Ct.
Com. Pleas 1963); Van Iderstine v. Lane Pipe Corp., 89 A.D.2d 459, 455 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1982);
DeLoach v. Whitney, 275 S.C. 543, 273 S.E.2d 768 (1981); Delta Ref. Co. v. Procon, Inc., 552
S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); cf Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of Am.,
575 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. III. 1983) (strict liability cause of action against roofer for failure of
roofing materials dismissed); Gobhai v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 85 A.D.2d 566, 445
N.Y.S.2d 445 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 839, 442 N.E.2d 61, 455 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1982) (sum-
mary judgment granted to defendant airline who had provided passenger with defective
slippers).
147. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
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sonal injuries when the beautician applied a defective permanent wave solu-
tion to her hair. The court determined that the transaction constituted a
sales-service hybrid transaction because it contained aspects of both a sale
and a service. 148 The transaction resembled a service in that the beautician
applied the solution to the plaintiff's hair.149 On the other hand, the trans-
action resembled the sale of a product because the beautician's fee included
the price of the permanent wave solution.150 Thus, the beautician supplied a
good to the plaintiff for consideration.' 5 1 In justification for its decision, the
court explained that because the beautician regularly engaged herself in a
commercial enterprise, she occupied the legal status of a retailer. 152 As a
retailer, the beautician could bring an indemnity action against the manufac-
turer of the permanent wave solution, and thereby place the ultimate respon-
sibility on the party responsible for creating the defective product. 5 3 The
court therefore held the beautician strictly liable under section 402A. 
154
In Gobhai v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 155 the New York Court of Ap-
peals refused to hold an airline strictly liable when it provided defective slip-
pers to its first class passengers. 156 The court based its decision on a
determination that the airline provided passengers with a service and that
the slippers provided to first class passengers were wholly incidental to the
service. 157 The dissent argued that the court should not have granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendant because a question existed as to whether or
not the airline sold the slippers to the passengers. 158 Although the dissent
agreed that the airline provided a service, it argued that the airline also sold
the slippers to the passengers. 159 The dissent reasoned that by incorporating
the price of the slippers into the higher fare the airline charged to first class
passengers, the airline in effect sold the slippers.160 Therefore, the dissent's
reasoning ran, because the airline distributed the slippers to its passengers,
thereby placing them into the stream of commerce, strict liability should
apply to the airline when the slippers ended up being defective.' 6'
In contrasting Gobhai to Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,162 a blood
transfusion case in which the court refused to hold a hospital strictly liable
for the transfusion of impure blood, the dissent emphasized the difference in
the necessity of using the defective product while rendering the service. 163




152. Id. at 704.
153. Id. at 705.
154. Id.
155. 85 A.D.2d 566, 445 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 839, 442 N.E.2d 61, 445
N.Y.S.2d 7642 (1982).
156. 442 N.E.2d at 62, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
157. Id. at 64, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
158. Id. at 62, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 765 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 62-63, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 64, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
162. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
163. 442 N.E.2d at 64, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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Whereas the blood transfusion was an essential part of the transaction, the
slippers in Gobhai were not a necessary element in the rendition of the air
transportation.164 Furthermore, in contrast to Perlmutter,'65 no public pol-
icy supported a refusal to apply strict liability to service providers who
placed defective products into commerce when the product was not essential
to the service provided. 166 In essence, the dissent determined that strict lia-
bility should apply to service providers who incidentally use unnecessary
products during the rendition of a service, but strict liability should not ap-
ply to service providers who incidentally use a product that is an essential
element of the service.167
Although Texas courts have not decided a case involving a nonprofes-
sional sales-service hybrid transaction, Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc. 168 foreshadows how Texas courts will most likely handle hybrid non-
professional, commercial transactions. 169 In Challoner the premature explo-
sion of a 105 millimeter howitzer shell seriously injured the plaintiff. The
court held the defendant, who manufactured the ammunition for the United
States Government according to the Government's designs and specifica-
tions, strictly liable. 170 The court found the defendant liable despite the fact
that the Government supplied both the components and the designs for the
ammunition and the defendant, in essence, merely provided the service of
assembling the shells.171 The court determined that section 402A applied to
the defendant because the transaction in question was entirely commercial in
nature. 172 The defendant placed the defective ammunition into the stream
of commerce via a commercial transaction. 17 3
164. Id.
165. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
166. 442 N.E.2d at 64, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
167. Id. Apparently no subsequent case has followed the dissent's opinion.
168. 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975). The court applied Texas substantive law in deciding the
case.
169. Generally, when the transaction is commercial in nature courts will find the sale of a
product within § 402A because the policy justifications of strict liability apply to the commer-
cial transactions. When the transaction is professional in nature the courts have found that
services predominate, that the service provider did not sell a product, and thus, that § 402A
does not apply. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954) (test hole
driller not liable in absence of negligence or intentional misconduct); Barbee v. Rogers, 425
S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist not held strictly liable for improperly fitted contact
lenses); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hospital not held strictly liable for injection of contaminated drug).
170. 512 F.2d at 80. As a result of Boyle v. United Technologies, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 442, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 559, 102 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1988), the court would decide the
case differently today. The Supreme Court established the government contractor defense in
Boyle. 108 S. Ct. at 2575, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 458. This defense immunizes government contrac-
tors who follow government specifications from strict tort liability. Id.
171. 512 F.2d at 82. The defendant in Challoner merely provided a service for the Govern-
ment in that it only assembled the ammunition. The defendant did not provide the parts,
make the parts, or design the parts or finished product. Just as an electrician who reconnects
an already existing loose wire, the defendant in Challoner provided a service by assembling
already existing parts. Furthermore, the Government gave the parts to the defendant, the
defendant did not sell the parts or the finished ammunition to the Government, it merely
charged the Government for its services in assembling the ammunition.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court stated that while a literal sale of a product is not required to impose
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3. Restaurateurs
Texas, along with several other jurisdictions, applies strict liability to res-
taurateurs. 174  A consumer's interaction with a restaurant constitutes a
sales-service hybrid transaction. Although the restaurant provides a service
to the patron when it prepares and serves the food, it also sells the food
products to its patrons. In this respect, the sales-service hybrid transaction
performed by restaurateurs differs from those types of sales-service transac-
tions where the fee charged is essentially for the services provided rather
than for products incidentally used in providing the service. 175 Unlike many
service transactions where the service provider furnishes a product only inci-
dentally to furnishing a service, a restaurateur does not provide food only
incidentally to its preparation. The restaurateur charges for providing the
food, for preparing the food, and for serving the food. Thus, the food is a
substantial part of the restaurant's service.
Although most jurisdictions impose strict liability on the restaurateurs
under an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption, 176 they could
just as easily do so under section 402A. 177 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts suggests that strict tort liability applies to restaurateurs because they
act, in actuality, as sellers of food products for consumption. 178 Several
other reasons also justify the imposition of strict tort liability on restaura-
teurs. For instance, restaurant patrons reasonably expect that the food
served by a restaurant will be wholesome, unadulterated, and appropriate for
consumption. 179 In this sense, the patron relies on the restaurateur's skills in
the selection and preparation of the food served.'180 Furthermore, the impo-
sition of strict liability on restaurateurs furthers the loss distribution goals
underlying strict tort liability. 181 A restaurateur who does not act negli-
gently in serving food unsuitable for consumption may seek indemnity from
the manufacturer or supplier responsible for creating the unwholesome con-
strict liability, the defendant must have transmitted the product into the stream of commerce
by virtue of a transaction which is "essentially commercial in nature." Id.
174. See, e.g., Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (implied warranty);
Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 1949) (implied warranty); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Garza, 390 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (implied warranty); Brumit v. Cokins, 281 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (implied warranty); Levy v. Paul, 207 Va. 100, 147 S.E.2d 722, 726
(1966) (implied warranty).
175. For example, a dentist charges a set fee for a check-up appointment regardless of
whether he takes one x-ray or two. On the other hand, a restaurateur charges each customer
differently depending on the entree ordered.
176. See cases cited supra note 174.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965) states in part: "The
rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for
use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any whole-
sale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant." Id.
178. Id.; see, e.g., Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84, 86-87 (1970); Hebert v.
Loveless, 474 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. See Sales, Product Liability Law in Texas, 23 Hous. L. REV. 299, 335 (1986).
180. Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 867-69 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
181. Id. at 869-70.
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dition of the food. 182 More importantly, the restaurateur may distribute the
costs of liability through increased prices that will be paid by all of the res-
taurant's patrons. 83  Lastly, restaurateurs can protect themselves by
purchasing liability insurance. 184
The court in Brumit v. Cokins 185 held a restaurant operator strictly liable
when the plaintiff received injuries from drinking a milkshake containing
glass fragments. ' 8 6 The court imposed liability under an implied warranty
of fitness for human consumption.' 87 In justification for its decision, the
court explained that the implied warranty resulted from a public policy that
food sold for immediate consumption must be wholesome and unadulter-
ated. 18 8 The court determined that the public policy behind protecting the
health of the general public mandated the application of an implied
warranty. 189
In Herbert v. Loveless 190 the plaintiffs became ill after consuming impure
ice at the defendant's restaurant. The court held the restaurant strictly lia-
ble.' 9' The court, however, imposed strict liability under section 402A
rather than under an implied warranty theory. 192 Later, the defendant res-
taurant brought an indemnity action against the manufacturer of the ice.
The Beaumont court of appeals, finding that the restaurant failed to establish
the defectiveness of the ice at the time it left the defendant's control, refused
to hold the ice manufacturer strictly liable.' 93
4. Public Utilities and Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions
Companies that provide public utilities, such as gas, water, and electricity,
often operate within the sphere of sales-service hybrid transactions. These
companies sell a product-electricity, gas, or water-to consumers, but they
also provide a service when they transmit the product to the consumer's
home or business. This service often involves making repairs and installing
pipes, cables, or lines. Texas courts have not unanimously agreed on how
these public utilities cases should be treated.
In Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Electric Cooperative 194 the plaintiffs filed
suit to recover for the death of a football coach who received fatal injuries
when a football goal post, which he was helping to erect, came into contact
with defendant's electrical wires. The plaintiffs claimed that strict liability
182. Id. at 867-68.
183. Id. at 870.
184. Id. at 869-70.
185. 281 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
186. Id. at 156.
187. Id. at 157.
188. Id.
189. Id. As a matter of public policy implied warranties exist to protect the health of the
general public. Id.
190. 474 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. Id. at 737.
192. Id. at 739.
193. Id.
194. 505 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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applied to the electric company because the company placed the transmis-
sion lines too low to the ground, thus making the power lines defective.
Although the court did not deny that the electric company sold electricity, it
refused to extend strict liability to the electric company. 95 The court deter-
mined that strict liability did not apply to the defendant because the electric-
ity did not constitute an unreasonably dangerous product. 196 The risk of
injury did not result from the defective manufacture or assembly of the elec-
tricity itself. 197 Nor did the injury result from a defective design. 198 Instead,
the risk of danger arose solely from the low location of the transmission
wires, the service aspect of the electric company's commercial
transaction. 199
Similarly, in Gray v. Enserch, Inc. 200 the Fort Worth court of appeals held
that strict tort liability did not apply to a gas explosion in the plaintiff's
home caused by the defendant's failure to repair a leak in a gas line. 20  As in
Erwin, the court concluded that the defendant did not sell a defective prod-
uct.20 2 The court therefore held that the doctrine of strict liability, which
requires the sale of a defective product, did not apply to the defendant gas
company because the gas did not constitute a defective product.2 0 3 If any-
thing, the defendant acted negligently in failing to repair the leak in the gas
line.
In Navarro City Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Prince20 4 the plaintiff received
an electric shock while adjusting a television antenna. The plaintiff filed suit
under an implied warranty theory, alleging that the electric company sold
and transmitted electricity through wires that were unfit for that purpose. 20 5
The defendant denied that implied warranties applied because it did not sell
the electricity with which the plaintiff allegedly came into contact. Instead,
the electric company argued that it merely transmitted the electricity along
high voltage lines to be distributed later to various outlets. The court never
denied that the defendant engaged in the business of selling electricity. It
did, however, deny that the electricity constituted a "good" as defined in the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 20 6 The court determined that the sale
195. Id. at 355-56.
196. Id. at 355.
197. Id. at 355-56.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 355.
200. 665 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. Id. at 605. The court also refused to hold the defendant liable under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977), which imposes strict liability for activities that are abnor-
mally dangerous. 665 S.W.2d at 606.
202. Id. at 605.
203. Id. The court explained that the doctrine would not apply in the absence of a defective
product. Id. The court said, "It]he doctrine of strict product liability will not apply against a
utility when the product delivered by the utility is not defective." Id. (citing Erwin v.
Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 355-63 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
204. 640 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
205. Id. at 399. Plaintiff relied on TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
206. 640 S.W.2d at 399-400. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
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of electricity more appropriately resembled the rendition of a service and did
not fall within the scope of the Business and Commerce Code's implied war-
ranties. 20 7 Consequently, the court refused to hold the defendant strictly
liable under an implied warranty of merchantability. 20 8
In Moody v. City of Galveston,209 however, the court hinted that it would
have held the city strictly liable under section 402A for selling defective
water to the plaintiff if the plaintiff had properly presented a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 210 The plaintiff in Moody sustained
injuries when gas leaking from her water faucet caught fire. Finding that the
city did engage itself in the business of selling water and that the water
amounted to a defective product because the presence of flammable gas in
the water lines created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff, the
court determined that the plaintiff had met the proof requirements necessary
for recovery under section 402A. 2 1 1
The court, however, found no Texas cases that clearly held that a munici-
pality engaged in selling water is a proper subject for the doctrine of strict
tort liability. 21 2 In determining that the city was a proper subject for liabil-
ity without fault, the court explained that the city, while furnishing water to
the plaintiff, acted in a proprietary capacity rather than in a discretionary
manner.2 1 3 When acting in a proprietary manner, the city became, just as a
private person, subject to the rules of tort liability, including strict liability
under section 402A. 214
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds21 5 the Houston court of
appeals upheld a strict liability judgment against a power and lighting com-
pany for injuries the plaintiff sustained when he used an aluminum pole to
1968) provides: "(a) 'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which
the price is to be paid, investment securities ... and things in action." Id.
207. 640 S.W.2d at 400. The court stated: "Had the Legislature intended to include serv-
ices within the implied warranty requirements of Section 2.314 it could have done so, as it did
in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but by specifically limiting it to goods the obvious intent
was to omit services from this section." Id. (citation omitted). Other jurisdictions have also
held that the sale of electricity constitutes the rendition of a service rather than the sale of
goods. See Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702, 707 (1975);
Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316, 318
(1972); Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 81 A.D.2d 700, 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647
(1981).
208. 640 S.W.2d at 400.
209. 524 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
210. Id. at 589.
211. Id. at 587.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 588.
214. Id. The court cited the following cases as authority for the proposition that a city
when acting in a proprietary manner is subject to tort liability just as a private person is: City
of Waco v. Busby, 396 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hodges v.
Lower Colorado River Auth., 163 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942, writ dism'd by
agr.); City of Wichita Falls v. Lipscomb, 50 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932,
writ ref'd).
215. 712 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986), rev'd, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.
1988).
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touch a power line that ran through a residential neighborhood. 2 16 The de-
fendant appealed the jury verdict, alleging that no strict liability cause of
action exists against electric companies for injuries resulting from contact
with distribution lines because electricity in a power line is not a product
within the ambit of products liability. The court disagreed and stated that
although the actual distribution of the electricity through the towers, poles,
and wires may be considered a service, the electricity itself was a consumable
product. 2 17 The court also rejected the defendant's contention that electric-
ity, while being transmitted in high voltage lines, was not a product entered
into the stream of commerce.2 1 8 As a result, the court held the defendant
strictly liable under the theory that a product introduced into the stream of
commerce may be unreasonably dangerous for purposes of section 402A if
the seller failed to give an adequate warning of dangers associated with the
product. 2 19 Although the electricity itself did not constitute an inherently
defective product, the court determined that the defendant's failure to give
an adequate warning of the dangers associated with contacting a high volt-
age distribution system rendered the electricity unreasonably dangerous.
22 0
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Professional/Nonprofessional Distinction
The majority of courts distinguish between professional sales-service hy-
brid transactions and nonprofessional hybrid transactions. 22 1 These courts
apply strict liability to nonprofessionals, but refuse to apply liability without
216. 712 S.W.2d at 762.
217. Id. (citing Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1985); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 887 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979)).
Reynolds appears to be indistinguishable from Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court, however, gives
no indication of why it refused to apply the Erwin holding to the case at hand. Perhaps the
court decided this case with the intention of alerting electric companies that they must ade-
quately warn of the dangers associated with high power voltage lines.
218. 712 S.W.2d at 766-67. The court in Reynolds made reference to Davis v. Gibson
Prod. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the
court stated, when discussing the definition of stream of commerce: "The stream of commerce
includes the manufacture of the object and its distribution, including the activities of retailers
... [I]t is clear that continuation of the flow of commerce does not require transfers of
possession." 712 S.W.2d at 766 (quoting Davis, 505 S.W.2d at 691). But see Hedges v. Public
Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 72 Ind. Dec. 561, 396 N.E.2d 933, 935 (1979) (so long as electricity is
being transmitted over electric wires under the exclusive control of the distributing power
company, the company has not placed the electricity into the stream of commerce).
219. 712 S.W.2d at 767 (citing Lopez v. Aro Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). A product may be proven defective if it is unreasonably
dangerous as designed, or it is unreasonably dangerous because of inadequate warnings or lack
of instructions. Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 346 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller
v. Brook Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. 1977).
220. 712 S.W.2d at 767.
221. See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1968) (strict
liability not applied to professional engineer); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 596-97,
258 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1969) (strict liability applied to beautician who applied defective perma-
nent wave solution in commercial transaction); Sales, supra note 43, at 24-36 (strict liability
not applicable to professionals).
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fault to professionals. 222 In actuality, however, neither a legal nor a concep-
tual basis for the distinction between the professional and the nonprofes-
sional in the sales-service hybrid context is easy to perceive. 223 Neither the
professional nor the nonprofessional engages in the regular business of sell-
ing products; instead, both engage in the business of providing skilled serv-
ices. 224 Furthermore, the consumer's expectation in a professional service
transaction where the service provider incidentally uses a product does not
differ from the consumer's expectation in a nonprofessional service transac-
tion in which the provider incidentally furnishes a product during the rendi-
tion of the service. 225 The consumer of either type of service expects that the
service provider will act in a competent and skillful manner. The expecta-
tion remains the same whether the service constitutes the repair of teeth or
the repair of a television. In both instances, if the service provider does not
perform the transaction in a skillful and competent manner, the injured con-
sumer can sue the service provider for negligence. 226 Furthermore, the risk
distribution capability of a nonprofessional service provider for loss resulting
from a defective product incidentally used during the rendition of the service
does not differ from the risk distribution of the professional service provider.
Neither the professional nor the nonprofessional engaged in sales-service hy-
brid transactions mass produces or sells goods to a large percentage of the
public compared to a product manufacturer, and thus, neither the profes-
sional nor the nonprofessional possesses a large customer pool among which
to distribute the costs of strict liability. Therefore, applying a different stan-
dard to nonprofessionals appears inappropriate when the rationale and pol-
icy considerations underlying strict liability apply with no more force to
nonprofessionals than they do to professionals. 227
B. Problems With Current Approaches
Courts and commentators have suggested several different analyses for
sales-service hybrid transaction cases. 228 For either of two reasons, how-
222. See supra note 146 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict liability and its
applicability to nonprofessionals.
223. See Note, supra note 62, at 399; Note, supra note 55, at 116-17; cf. Comment, Expan-
sion of Implied Warranty Coverage Under the DTPA: Service Contracts, 17 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 917, 937 (1986) (argument that regulation of professionals differentiates professionals
from nonprofessionals, who are not regulated by the state).
224. Note, supra note 62, at 399.
225. See Sales, supra note 43, at 34.
226. Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J.
Super. 278, 227 A.2d 539, 546 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 59,
250 A.2d 129 (1969).
227. For a more complete discussion of the professional, nonprofessional distinction see
sources cited supra note 223.
228. Some courts have analyzed sales-service hybrid transactions by applying an essence of
the transaction test. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Allied Proper-
ties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972).
Other courts and commentators have based the determination as to whether strict liability
applies by looking either at the burden on the plaintiff of proving negligence or at the commer-
cial or professional nature of the transaction. See Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512
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ever, these approaches have failed to solve the problem of deciphering sales-
service hybrid transactions. First, an approach often fails because the stan-
dard rests on faulty logic. Second, even if an approach is sound, courts often
refuse to adopt and use that particular standard, or they apply the standard
inconsistently. Whatever the reason, the result remains the same: courts
continue to decide hybrid cases purely on an ad hoc basis. 229
Some courts and commentators have argued that the determination as to
whether strict liability applies to a specific cause of action rests on the es-
sence of the transaction. 230 The essence of the transaction test 23 1 looks at
the essential element of the transaction and determines if it resembles more
the sale of a product or the rendition of a service. 232 If the court determines
that the transaction primarily consists of the sale of products, then strict
liability applies. 233 If the court determines that the rendition of services con-
stitutes the essence of the transaction, then negligence rather than strict lia-
bility applies to the case.234
Although at first glance the essence of the transaction test appears logical
and easy to apply, the test contains one flaw: does one determine the essence
of the transaction by using a purely objective basis or by using a subjective
basis? For example, suppose a doctor diagnoses a patient and tells the pa-
tient that the problem can be cured by taking medication. The patient, how-
ever, must go to the hospital to obtain the medication. The treatment
consists of taking the medication once every twenty-four hours for six days.
The patient must remain at the hospital for the entire six days so that nurses
can monitor the effects of the drug. The drug turns out to be defective.
Does strict liability apply to the hospital?
In applying the essence of the transaction test, courts may differ on the
character of the patient's interaction with the hospital. A court viewing the
situation objectively could well decide that the patient primarily paid for the
hospital's services, because those who are sick go to hospitals so that the
doctors' and hospitals' professional services will cure them. Subjectively,
however, the patient may have considered the essence of the relationship to
F.2d 77, 82 (1975); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 596-97, 258 A.2d 697, 702-03
(1969); Powers, supra note 54, at 429-32. An Illinois court of appeals applied an "integral part
of the distribution chain" test. Niffenegger v. Lakeland Constr. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d 420, 423,
420 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1981). In addition one commentator has suggested a combined essence-
source test. See Note, supra note 62, at 400-04.
229. For an illustration of how courts have decided hybrid cases, see supra note 77.
230. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,
643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982). The Texas Supreme Court has used the essence of the
transaction test when analyzing cases concerning the scope of UCC article 2. See Robichaux,
643 S.W.2d at 394. The court, however, has not applied the essence test in § 402A cases. See
Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968).
231. Some courts and commentators refer to this test as the essence of the transaction test,
while others refer to this test as the essence of the business test.
232. See Note, supra note 55, at 113-15.
233. See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144, 147 (1936); W. PROSSER,
supra note 124, § 95, at 638 (4th ed. 1971).
234. See Valiance & Co. v. De Anda, 595 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980,
no writ); Dixon v. Four Seasons Bowling Alley, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 540, 424 A.2d 428
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
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have been the purchase of the medication. Since the patient knew his condi-
tion and knew that the drug would cure it, his primary concern lay with
obtaining the drug, which he could administer himself, rather than with hav-
ing a nurse check his reaction to the drug every few hours. Clearly, the
result of any particular case may vary depending upon whether the court
applies the essence test objectively or subjectively.
One commentator has suggested an expanded version of the essence
test,2 35 by which a court would analyze a hybrid case using a two-step pro-
cess. 236 First, the court should determine the essential or predominent na-
ture of the transaction. 237 Second, the court should determine whether the
plaintiff's injury resulted from a defective product or from defective ser-
vice. 238 The proponent argues that courts must apply the nature of the
transaction and the source of the defect tests together in order to identify
cases in which the imposition of strict liability furthers the policies underly-
ing liability without fault. 239 Once again, however, the problem of whether
to apply a subjective or objective standard arises when applying this test. 240
Another commentator has stated that courts should rely on the proof ra-
tionale 24' underlying strict products liability in determining whether specific
sales-service hybrid transactions more closely resemble sales of products or
more closely resemble services. 24 2 The proponent of this proof test asserts
that only the proof rationale underlying strict liability distinguishes defective
product cases from defective service cases. 243 He argues that strict liability
governs defective product cases because of the plaintiff's substantial inability
235. See Note, supra note 62, at 400-04.
236. Id. at 404-07.
237. Id. at 400-02.
238. Id. at 402-04. For cases applying the source of defect test, see Nastasi v. Hochman, 58
A.D.2d 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (1977); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.
1968); Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wash. App. 816, 572 P.2d 737 (1977), rev'd, 91
Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233, 236 (1978).
239. Note, supra note 62, at 404. For demonstrations of the application of the combined
essence of the transaction and source of defect test, see id. at 404-07.
240. In applying the first part of the essence-source test, we must determine whether the
essence of the transaction was a sale or a service. For example, assume a man took his car to
an automotive shop to have the motor repaired. At the shop he learned that a new $1.00 part
would remedy the problem. Was the man's main purpose in taking the car to the shop to
purchase the necessary part or to have a mechanic repair his car? Most people viewing the
situation objectively would assume that the man considered the predominant purpose of the
transaction to be the acquisition of the mechanic's skilled services. The man himself, however,
might feel that his reason for taking his car to the repair shop was to purchase a new part.
Thus, a subjective interpretation of man's main purpose for taking the car to the shop could be
that he intended to purchase merely the needed part rather than the mechanic's services. See
supra text following note 234 for another example of the problems created in applying the
essence test.
241. The proof rationale is based on the premise that courts would be unduly burdening
plaintiffs by requiring them to prove negligence in product cases.
242. See Powers, supra note 54, at 429-32.
243. Id. at 429. Powers argues that the proof test provides a comprehensive approach that
embodies the rationales underlying strict liability. Powers, however, admits that the proof test
does not answer all of the questions. Mainly, the test does not determine whether a product or
a service is involved in a hybrid transaction case. Also, this test fails to resolve such issues as
whether courts should treat professionals differently from nonprofessionals and whether the
test applied in warranty cases should also be the test applied in tort cases. Id. at 432.
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to prove the defendant's negligence. 24 4 Negligence, on the other hand, gov-
erns service cases because the plaintiff in a service case enters into a face-to-
face relationship with the service provider, which enables the plaintiff to
point to the defendant's specific negligent act. 245 Courts deciding hybrid
transaction cases should therefore inquire whether the case is of the type
that raises the proof rationale of strict products liability: would the plaintiff
be unduly burdened if required to establish the defendant's negligence?
Although the proof test provides courts with a workable method of analyz-
ing hybrid cases, no court has expressly adopted this test.
Lastly, some courts and commentators have argued that strict liability
applies to any defendant who places a defective product into the stream of
commerce via a commercial transaction. 246 The stream of commerce test, or
the integral part of the distribution chain test, as one court has referred to
it,247 distinguishes the sale of a product from the rendition of a service ac-
cording to the context in which the transaction arises. 248 If the transaction
is commercial in nature, the proponents of the stream of commerce test ar-
gue that the transaction involves the sale of a product, and strict liability
applies. 249 They argue that strict liability applies to transactions that are
commercial in nature because the policy justifications underlying strict lia-
bility apply to this type of transaction. 250 If, however, the sales-service hy-
brid transaction is professional in nature, they argue that no product sale
occurs and, instead, that a service predominates and calls for the application
of a negligence standard. 25 1 The proponents of this test justify the distinc-
tion between commercial transactions and professional transactions on the
rationale that the policies behind strict liability do not apply to cases involv-
ing professionals. 2 52 In applying the stream of commerce test, courts often
244. Id. at 425, 430-31; see La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir.
1968); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 435, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363 A.2d 955, 958
(1976); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W 2d 379, 391 (1977).
245. Powers, supra note 54, at 425-27.
246. See Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1975); La Rossa
v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1968); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54
N.J. 585, 596-97, 258 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1969); Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Serv-
ices-Will Another Citadel Crumble?, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 298, 311-14 (1977).
247. Niffenegger v. Lakeland Constr. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d 420, 420 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1981).
248. Maloney, Murray, Byrne & Schoenfeld, Symposium on Product's Liability, 57 MARQ.
L. REV. 623, 635-36 (1974).
249. See, e.g., Watchel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84, 86 (1970) (sandwich sold at
restaurant is commercial product and strict liability applied); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54
N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1966) (strict liability applied to beauty parlor operator who
placed defective product into stream of commerce through commercial transaction); Held v. 7-
Eleven Food Store, 108 Misc. 2d 754, 438 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (strict liability
not applied to store when customer fell and injured himself on store sidewalk because sidewalk
not product that store placed into stream of commerce).
250. See Maloney, Murray, Byrne & Schoenfeld, supra note 250, at 635-36.
251. See, e.g., Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal.
App. 3d 898, 914, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886, 894 (1981) (strict liability not applied to architects or
engineers); Castaldo v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88 (Del. 1977) (strict liability
not applied to engineer); Hall v. State, 106 Misc. 2d 860, 435 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(strict liability not applied to bridge designer).
252. Reynolds, supra note 248, at 311-14. See generally Wunsch, supra note 9, at 358-59
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do not require a finding of a literal sale before holding that strict liability
applies. 253 For instance, in Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc.,254 the
court held the defendant manufacturer strictly liable because the defendant
placed a defective product into the stream of commerce via a "cost plus"
contract, not because it sold a defective product. 255
Although several courts have applied a stream of commerce test, the test
does not present a comprehensive method for analyzing sales-service hybrid
transactions. In essence, the distinction between commercial and profes-
sional transactions does no more than attempt to separate those situations in
which the application of strict liability furthers the policies underlying the
theory from those situations in which the imposition of strict liability does
not further the underlying goals of the theory. In this sense the classification
system presents courts with a good starting point in determining which cases
strict liability should govern. That, however, is all that the classification
system offers.
C. A Unifying Policy Test
Past efforts to determine whether strict liability applies to sales-service
hybrid transactions have failed to result in a uniform analysis of the sales-
service problem. A step towards the solution of the problem, however, lies
in a policy-need approach, 25 6 which balances the justifications for strict lia-
bility,25 7 such as cost internalization, ability to detect and prevent defects,
the burden of proof, and justified reliance, against the general public's need
to maintain affordable economic access to the product or service. This ap-
proach requires, in addition to careful consideration of the accepted justifica-
tions for strict liability, a determination of how necessary the particular type
of hybrid transaction is to the overall public welfare.
When the product or service does not constitute an essential element to
the public welfare, increased prices will not unduly harm the public and
thereby undermine the policies supporting strict liability. Conversely, when
the product or service is a public necessity, increased prices and diminished
(policies behind strict liability not furthered when applied to services); cf Note, supra note 62,
at 399 (policies behind strict liability furthered when applied to either sale or service
transactions).
253. See generally Phipps, When Does a "Service" Become a "Sale"?, 39 INS. COUNS. J.
274, 278-79 (1972) (author discusses cases where courts have extended meaning of "sale").
254. 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975).
255. Id. at 82.
256. For a discussion of a policy type approach, see Comment, supra note 12, at 597-601.
257. Comment c to § 402A suggests the justification for imposing such liability:
The seller, by marketing his products for use and consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming pub-
lic who may be injured by it . . . public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
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access unjustifiably harms the general public, and the need for affordable
public access outweighs the need for the imposition of strict liability. Courts
should impose strict liability only in the former cases, when the public's need
for access to the service does not outweigh the other objectives of strict lia-
bility. For instance, courts should more readily impose strict liability upon
beauticians, as in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,258 because the public as a
whole would not suffer as a result of increased hair salon prices, and the
imposition of liability would further the policies underlying strict liability.
The imposition of strict liability in this situation would spread the risk of the
loss occasioned by the injury, would ease the plaintiff's burden of proof, and
would protect the consumer's justified reliance in the transaction. By con-
trast, as in Magrine v. Krasnica,2 59 courts should not impose strict liability
upon medical professionals because the public as a whole must have access
to affordable health care. The general public would suffer if health care ac-
cess became limited because of the imposition of strict liability on health
care professionals.
In addition to considering the policies and rationales underlying strict lia-
bility, the courts must take into account the necessity of the particular type
of transaction and weigh the effect of the imposition of strict liability on the
general public against the good the imposition of strict liability would do for
one particular plaintiff. Thus, courts will have to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the imposition of strict liability furthers the policy justifica-
tions for the theory by taking into account all of the rationales behind the
theory and the degree of public necessity for the transaction. If the court
finds an absolute public necessity, as is the case with health care, then the
court should not impose strict liability. On the other hand, if the court finds
no public necessity for the transaction, then public policy does not foreclose
the imposition of strict liability when other justifications for the theory are
furthered.
IV. CONCLUSION
A single, appropriate test for determining the correctness of the imposi-
tion of strict liability in sales-service hybrid transactions appears not to exist
at this time. Courts have applied a variety of ad hoc tests to this type of
transaction and, as a result, have reached inconsistent results. At times the
imposition of strict liability furthers the policy considerations governing the
doctrine and at times it does not. When deciding hybrid transaction cases,
courts should always keep in mind the policies they are attempting to fur-
ther. Thus, sales-service cases must be decided not by applying one particu-
lar test but by focusing on the policies underlying the imposition of strict
258. 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d I I (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697 (1969). For a discussion of Newmark, see supra notes 147-154 and accompanying
text.
259. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub non. Magrine
v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 259,




liability. In focusing on the goals behind the theory courts must also con-
sider the necessity of the transaction. Although the sales-service case results
will not always be predictable, and although courts may continue to be ac-
cused of deciding cases on an ad hoc basis, the best formula on which to base
decisions in this area is that of a policy approach. Deciding hybrid transac-
tion cases on the basis of the policy considerations underlying strict liability
provides a workable, administrable, and fair framework from which courts
can begin to inject consistency into an uncertain area of the law.



